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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish
Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program, named after the 1906 Nobel
Prize in Physiology Santiago Ramón y Cajal. The Program was motivated
by two pervasive problems: the scarcity of R&D personnel in Spain and
the commonly accepted practice of endogamy or inbreeding in the Spanish
academia. To mitigate this situation, the Spanish Government thus decided
to establish a Program aimed at nancing top and promising researchers
with a centralized selection procedure under rigourous and objective criteria.
Those selected researchers would receive a ve-year contract in a Spanish
research center, as well as priority in their choices of research in accordance
with their relative position in the ranking. Afterwards, the research centers
chosen by the corresponding selected candidates would receive a subsidy of
eighty percent of the researchers salary for the ve-year period, paid during
each of the years in a decreasing scheme.
The objective of the program was double: to encourage Spanish research
centers to hire top researchers and to attract young promising researchers
to join Spanish research centers (See Sanz Menéndez, 2002 and 2003, for an
account of the institutional background). A key feature of the Program in its
rst two calls was that for a researcher to qualify, she needed a preacceptance
by a participant research center, that is, a formal commitment by the center
that it would hire the researcher if she was appointed by the Program. Behind
this requirement, it lay, according to the Spanish legislation, the exclusive
right of universities to hire their personnel. The research centers put forward
this issue within the discussion of the Ramón y Cajal Program rules, so that
they actually enforce a preacceptance stage in the Program design. However,
this requirement was relaxed in the third call, so that researchers without
preacceptance became elegible and preacceptance became optional, although
selected candidates with preacceptance kept priority in the centers that had
endorsed them. Finally, preacceptance was completely removed since the
fourth call.
We are very much intrigued by this change in the design of the Program.
We claim that it is a clear case of reaction from the players to the market
circumstances and a conclusive evidence that mechanisms can evolve accord-
ing with the needs and inuence of those who design them. We shall provide
support to this point both theoretical and empirically. In addition, we shall
analyze the evolution of the mechanism and its performance over time.
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With this purpose in mind, we use a two-sided matching model and build a
more general game. In this game, research centers have the possibility to play
any of the two di¤erent versions of the Ramón y Cajal matching mechanism
in each call. Therefore, a center can either play a version with the rules of
the rst two calls, 2001 and 2002, with the preaceptance requirement, or a
version of the fourth call, in 2004 and onwards, without the preaceptance
requirement (both mechanisms have been extensively analyzed in Romero-
Medina and Triossi, 2006). At the beginning of each call, the research centers
decide which mechanism to play by majority voting.
We study the incentives of the research centers to impose the candidate
preacceptance and remove it afterwards. Our theoretical results prove that
in a repeated game under the assumption that research personnel is scarce,
even endogamic institutions will prefer the procedure without preacceptance
to the original one after a nite number of calls. The rationale behind is that
after a nite numbers of calls, the cost to the centers of searching suitable
candidates by themselves is high enough that they will prefer a centralized
selection procedure in which any researcher is allowed to apply. On the
other hand, the pressure from the insiders (those endorsed by the centers)
who initially met the conditions to apply has almost disappeared, so that
preaceptance does no longer play the role to exclude insider competitors
from the market.
Our assumptions and theoretical results are confronted with the data
about applications in the rst ve calls of the Ramón y Cajal Program. We
rst provide descriptive evidence that supports our assumptions. We then
take advantage of the changes in the application rules in 2003 and 2004, by
which potential candidates in two di¤erent groups, those who are insiders
in research centers and those who are not, are a¤ected di¤erently by such
changes. We measure such di¤erential e¤ect in order to measure the ef-
fect of the policy change, and enquire whether such estimated e¤ect keeps
coherency with our theoretical results. We see that the change in the pro-
cedure rules, which majorly consists on the removal of the preacceptance
requirement, favors the opportunities of outsider candidates, what is consis-
tent with the predictions of our theoretical model. This e¤ect is found both
when we measure the e¤ect in the score achieved by each applicant in the
evaluation process, and when we consider the probability that each applicant
is appointed by the Program.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows Section 2 introduces the basic
matching model. Section 3 introduces and analyzes and the mechanisms used
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in the Ramón y Cajal Program both the old new and the dynamic game that
we build upon then along the di¤erent calls of the program. Section 4 presents
the theoretical implications of the model and Section 5 presents the policy
analysis from data on Program applications in the rst ve calls, between
2001 and 2005. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The problem considered here consists of:
1. a set of departments (or research centers) D = fd1; :::; dkg,
2. a set of researchers R = fr1; :::; rfg,
3. a list of strict departmentspreferences over researchers PD = (Pd1 ; :::; Pdk),
4. a list of strict researcherspreferences over departments PR =
 
Pr1 ; :::Prf

.
The triple (D;R; P ), where P = (PD; PR) is called a Matching Mar-
ket. Let d 2 D. Department ds preference prole, Pd is a strict order
dened on 2R, the set of all subsets of R.1 Let R0  R be a set of re-
searchers. The favorite group of researchers for department d is willing to
hire among the ones belonging to R0 is called the choice set from R0 and is
denoted byChd(R0; Pd), orChd(R0), when no ambiguity is possible. Formally,
Chd(R
0; Pd) = argmaxPd fR00 : R00  R0g. If ?PdR0 department d prefers not
to employ any researcher rather than jointly employing the researchers in R0
and R0 is called unacceptable to d. Otherwise R0 is acceptable to d.
The maximum numbers of researchers department d is willing to hire is
ds quota and is denoted by qd (or qi if d = di for some i = 1; ::; k). Formally
qd = max f]R0 : Chd(R0; Pd) 6= ?g, and the set of every department quotas is
denoted as q = (q1; :::; qk). For any researcher r 2 R, her preference prole,
Pr is a strict order dened on D [ frg. Any department d such that sPrd is
said to be unacceptable to r. It means that r prefers to stay unemployed
rather than joining department d. Otherwise d is said to be acceptable to
r.
1As usual, for all r; r0 2 S and for all d 2 D, rPdr0, rPf? and ?Pdd denote frgPd fr0g,
frgPd? and ?Pd frg, respectively.
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An important role is played by application costs, for this reason a cardinal
representation of researcherspreferences is introduced. For each r 2 R let
ur be a function ur : D [ frg !R representing Pr, that is, for all d; d0 2 D,
dPrd
0 if and only if ur(d) > ur(d0)
and
dPrd
0 if and only if ur(d) > ur(r):
Let  > 0 be the cost that each researcher r pays in order to apply to each
department2, in the old mechanism. It represents the participation costs, the
cost to participate to the centralized selection, to be paid only once in the
new mechanism. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that ur(d)    > 0,
for all d such that ur(d) > ur(r). It means that each researcher is willing to
apply to any acceptable department. For each x 2 D [ R, Rx denotes xs
weak preference relation.
A matching is a function that assigns researchers to departments. For-
mally:
Denition 1 A matching on (D;R) is a function  : D [ R ! 2R [ D,
such that, for every (d; r) 2 D R
1. (d) 2 2R,
2. (r) 2 D [ frg,
3. (r) = d, r 2 (d).
A matching is individually rational if no department is willing to reject
any researcher who has been assigned to, and each researcher prefers such
assignment rather than none. Formally:
Denition 2 The matching  is individually rational if
1. Chd((d)) = (d) 8 d 2 D
2. r 2 R if (r)Rrr 8r 2 R .
2There is no loss of generality in assuming that the costs of applying to di¤erent de-
partments is the same for all departments and all researchers. Otherwise, one can re-rank
departments taking into account application costs.
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A matching  is blocked by a department-researcher pair (d; r) if d and r
are not assigned each other but r would prefer to join d rather than her mate
under  and d would hire r if it was given to choose among the researchers
in (d) [ frg. Formally:
Denition 3 The matching  is blocked by the pair (d; r) 2 D R if:
1. dPr(r),
2. r 2 Chd((d) [ frgg.
Finally:
Denition 4 The matching  is stable in market (D;R; P ) if it is indi-
vidually rational and if no pair blocks it. Otherwise  is unstable.
 (D;R; P ) denotes the stable set, the set of matchings that are stable
in market (D;R; P ).
The stable set may be empty. The literature has focused on preference
restrictions where researchers are not seen as complements. More precisely,
a departments preferences are substitutable if it wants to hire a researcher
even when other researchers become unavailable.
Along the paper and to guarantee the existence of stable matching, we
shall assume that preferences of departments over groups of researchers are
responsive to the preferences they have among individual researchers
Denition 5 Let d 2 D and let Pd a strict order on R. P#d over sets
of researchers is responsive to Pd over individual researchers if, whenever
0(d) = (d)
S frg n fg for in (d) and r not in (d);then d prefers 0(d)
to (d) (under P#d ) if and only if d prefers r to  (under Pd):
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) have shown that, under this restriction, the
deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) produce either the
department-optimal or the researcher-optimal stable matching, depending on
whether the departments or the researchers make the o¤er.
In our analysis, the outcome of the mechanism is compared with the
one where preferences of research centers meet the ranking of the candidates
provided by the governmental agency and based on objective criteria. This
ranking will be represented by a strict order T over the set of researchers.
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If a department evaluates research group according to T , we say that its
preferences are meritocratic. More precisely, a department hasmeritocratic
preferences if she would prefer to hire researcher r rather than r0, if and
only if r is better ranked than r0 according to T , irrespective of any other
researcher in the set of applicants. In other words, Pd is meritocratic if it is
responsive to T , which is
Denition 6 Let d 2 D and let T a strict order on R. P#d over sets are
responsive to T if, for all R0  R such that ]R0  qd and for all r, r0 2 R,
R0 [ frgP#d R0 [ frg () rTr0.
The objective of the Government is to give priority to better researchers:
The better a researcher is ranked, the higher her priority to choose her a¢ l-
iation. We say that a Social Choice Rule is responsive to the ranking if no
researcher envies a worse ranked one. Let  be a class of matching markets
and let F be a correspondence from  to the set of matchings on (D;R).
Denition 7 F is responsive to T if 8(D;R; P ) 2  and 8 2 F (D;R; P ),
rTr0 and  (r) 2 D =)  (r)Rr (r0), 8r; r0 2 R.
The concept of implementation used throughout the paper is implemen-
tation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE from now on). Let Ex be a set
of strategies for player x 2 R[D and let E =
Y
x2R[D
Ex be the set of strategy
proles. A matching mechanism is described as the set of strategies available
to each agent and by a function  that assigns a matching to each prole of
strategies.
Denition 8 A matching mechanism implements F in Subgame Per-
fect Equilibrium (SPE) if
1. 8 (D;R; P ) 2  and 8  2 D(D;R; P ) there exists a SPE of the game
G = fD;R; P; g yielding  as outcome,
2. each SPE outcome of G belongs to F (D;R; P ).
Throughout the paper, only equilibria in pure strategies are considered.
Finally we shall, for the purpose of our analysis, divide the researchers in
two types: The researchers that are insiders in a research department and
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those that are not. Therefore at call of the program t a set of researchers,
Rt is available Rt = I t [ Ot. I t is the set of insiders at time t. I t =
[
d2D
I td.
I td0 \ I td = ? (each researcher is insider of at most one center. I t \ Ot 6= ?,
in general).
3 The Ramón y Cajal Program
The Ramón y Cajal Program was established by the Spanish Government in
a general context of lack of R&D personnel in Spain and with Spanish Uni-
versities hiring policies into question. This latter issue has generated a lively
debate that has spread out on international press and scientic journals. The
two main issues are: (i) the lack of enough funding and (ii) the existence of
social networks that regardless of the candidate scientic merits, systemati-
cally hire one of their members (Navarro and Rivero, 2001). Inbreeding has
a long tradition in Spain. Its existence has been linked with poor scientic
performance (see, for instance, Eisenberg and Wells, 2000; Soler, 2001). In
addition, Spanish academia su¤ers from hostility towards researchers who
had completed their training abroad (Ferrer, 2000).
In order to encourage hiring of R&D personell in research centers while
circumventing the aforementioned distorsions, the Spanish Government im-
plemented the Ramón y Cajal Program. The Program would nance ve-
years contracts in research centers to the selected researchers. The selection
procedure was centralized in an evaluation agency, Agencia Nacional de
Evaluación y Prospectiva (ANEP). This evaluation agency, appointed by
the Government, appraises all elegible applicants based in rigorous and objec-
tive evaluation criteria (mainly publication records), in which the better the
researchers, the higher their priority to choose available positions. For that
purpose, 24 evaluation committees of Spanish and international experts, one
in each research eld, were constituted by the evaluation agency (see Siune,
1999). Overall, 341 experts took part in the evaluation in every call. If a
contract was granted to a researcher, she could join the research departments
that had preaccepted her. The objective was twofold: (i) to provide incen-
tives to research centers to hire top researchers and (ii) to encourage top
researchers to join Spanish research centers.
In order to illustrate our theoretical claims associated to the evolution of
the Ramón y Cajal Program, we will provide data evidence about characteris-
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tics and outcomes of research applicants in di¤erent calls. The data analyzed
have been provided by the Dirección General de Investigación of the Minis-
terio de Educacion y Ciencia. We have data on researcher applications and
information provided by the 151 research institutions that participated in the
Program in ve annual calls between 2001 and 2005. We have dropped from
the sample those observations with missing status or score or with missing
values in individual characteristics, which represents less than one percent
of observations. Most participant institutions have more than one research
department among the 24 research areas in with the applicants where di-
vided. A total of 24 committees, one for each research discipline, created by
the Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva (ANEP) evaluated the
applicants.
When the Ramón y Cajal Program was started, there was a large number
of Spanish researchers that were already on the system under temporary
positions, that hereinafter we will denominate as insiders. Most of them had
a low probability to get a stable contract within the Spanish R&D system,
mainly because of lack of funding. Regarding this, the empirical evidence
about the rst call in Table 1 is quite clear. Among those applicants who
obtained a contract in 2001, 60 percent were insiders, that is, researcher
already in the system.
The original design of the Program, which determined the matching mech-
anism, was essentially kept in the rst three calls, from 2001 to 2003. Since
the fourth call, in 2004, there was a key modication which a¤ected the
elegibility conditions. Specically, while the original design required the can-
didates to ask for a preacceptance by a participant research center, such
requirement was completely removed since 2004. Such preacceptance meant
that the center endorsed such candidate, with a formal commitment to hire
the researcher if she was appointed by the Program.
The thesis of this paper is that insider pressure compelled the original
design of the Program. However, when this pressure declined, such design
was no longer useful to the objectives of the research centers involved and
was reformed. Therefore, research centers accommodate the mechanism to
their needs, so that the apparently ill-designed procedure rules are in fact
crafted with a purpose in mind. Furthermore, when a rule no longer plays a
role, it is eliminated. In particular, the rule in question is the preaceptance
of the candidate by research centers, which is explained by the existence of a
sizeable stock of insiders in the R&D Spanish system that exerted pressure
on the Program. Whenever the stock of insiders dropped and then such
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pressure weakened, preacceptance was no longer optimal and was therefore
removed.
The existence and number of active insiders is crucial in our analysis
therefore we shall make an e¤ort to justify why they exist and how they
behave period after period. In the initial period the number of insiders and
the need to give them opportunities to nd an entry point in the Spanish
R&D system is among the political objectives of the program. For that
they perform a rigorous and objective evaluation based mainly in publication
records. In order to produce this evaluations Committees of Spanish and
international experts in each eld were appointed to review candidatures
and clear quality standards where established.
Under these circumstances, what happens with the insiders? The original
design, in practice, promoted collusion among research centers and prevented
outsiders to enter the evaluation process by no preaccepting them (Romero-
Medina and Triossi, 2006). Nevertheless, soon enough the research centers
consented that Program eligibility requirements become more demanding.
In the rst three calls, the requirements at the time of application for a
candidate to be eligible were to have a Ph.D. degree and to have spent at
least 18 months after obtaining her B.A. in a research center di¤erent than
the one she is applying to. However, while the preacceptance requirement
was removed in the fourth call, the candidate requirements became more
stringent. Since then, such requirements were to have a PhD degree, yet
obtained in the last ten years (with maternity leave, military service or great
illness excluded from time computation), and to have spent at least 24 months
after obtaining her PhD in a university or research center di¤erent than the
one she is applying to.
These tighter requirements challenged the possibilities of insiders to get a
contract through the Program.3 Very specially, the need to spend 24 months
in a di¤erent research center after obtaining the PhD jeopardizes insider
elegibility, and helps to break the implicit contracts that the research centers
might have with the insiders. We would then expect the number of insider
applicants to be reduced year by year because of several reasons. Some
of them get out of the pool of potential applicants either because they were
selected and got a contract in the earlier call, or because they fail to satisfy the
3At the same time another program called "Juan de la Cierva" vas developed aimed to
researchers that are about to present her doctoral dissertation or had done so in the last
three years.
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elegibility requirements in the next call. Among those insiders who remain
in the pool of potential applicants, their chances to be selected in next calls
depends on whether their quality ranks them above the quality threshold and
the number of positions available.
3.1 The Program design
We now present the corresponding matching mechanisms determined by the
two alternative designs of the Program. The rst matching mechanism, which
we call old mechanism, describes the original design used in the three rst
Program calls. The second matching mechanism, the new mechanism, is
the one in use since the fourth edition. In addition, we shall describe the
dynamic game where research centers can decide between both alternative
mechanisms in Subsection 3.1.3 and some additional simplifying assumptions
in Subsection 3.1.4.
3.1.1 The old mechanism
In a preliminary stage, each research department communicates to the evalu-
ation agency its quota (number of positions available) in each research area.
The evaluation agency must acknowledge such quota, and then decides the
maximum number of contracts to be nanced, denoted by Q =
Pk
i=1 qi.
The allocation procedure takes place as a ve stage game.
1. Researcher Preacceptance Applications. Each applicant asks a
preliminary acceptance to one or more departments. For each re-
searcher r 2 R, let D1(r) be the set of departments r applied to. For
each d 2 D, let R1(d) be the set of researchers applying to department
d.
2. Department Preacceptance Decisions. For each preacceptance
application received, each department decides to endorse the researcher
or not. A department preacceptance obliges it to appoint the endorsed
candidate a position if her application is granted and the ranking en-
ables her to choose such department. For each department d 2 D, let
R2(d)  R1(d) be the set of researchers with its preacceptance. For
each researcher r 2 R, let D2(r)  D1(r) be the set of departments
that has accepted her. Each department d with a positive number of
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endorsed candidates then noties to the the Government the set of re-
searchers R2(d) with preacceptances. Only the applicants with at least
one preacceptance are eligible.
The Evaluation Agency Ranks Preaccepted Researchers. Ap-
plicants are ranked by a committee of experts in each area. The ranking
criteria are public knowledge. The setup is one of complete information,
so we assume that the ranking itself is publicly known. Such ranking
is denoted by T , formally a strict order on R.
3. First Assignment. The selected researchers with at least one preac-
ceptance are assigned in accordance with the ranking T , until Q po-
sitions are lled. Priority is given to the best ranked applicants. The
ith ranked researcher is denoted by ri.The best ranked researcher, r1
is assigned to the department she chooses among the ones in D2(r1).
For i  Q, ri is assigned to the department she chooses among the
ones that have some spare positions in D2(ri), if any. The rest re-
main unmatched. At her turn, each researcher must choose a position
among the ones available in the departments that endorsed her. This
assignment is denoted by 1. If all positions are lled, the process ends.
Otherwise, the procedure goes to the fourth stage.
4. Second Preacceptance Decision. Each department d with unlled
positions is asked to submit a new list R4(d), of acceptable researchers
among the ri (i  Q) who are unmatched under 1. For every such ri,
let D4(ri) be the set of departments that preaccepted ri at this point
of the procedure.
5. Second Assignment. Unlled positions are appointed to the re-
searchers r such that, D4(r) 6= ? by the same procedure of stage 3,
and using R4 (r) instead of R2 (r). A second matching 2 is completed
with those selected researchers that remained unassigned in stage 3.
The process ends at this point.
The nal assignment  is obtained from 1 and 2 as follows: for i 
Q, (ri) = 1(ri) if 1(ri) 2 D, (ri) = 2(ri) otherwise. Set (r) = r
otherwise. At any point of the process, applicants can leave the game.
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Throughout the paper, we consider not only the full assignment proce-
dure, that we call the full game, but also the reduced game ending with the
rst assignment in stage 3, that we call reduced game. The full game is
analyzed extensively in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2006). In such paper, it
was shown that there can be equilibria where the stages four and ve plays
an active role. However, the set of stable matching can be implemented if
the reduced game is played. In fact, the full game is played by a tiny set of
agents, where stages 4 and 5 are explained by the existence of informational
problems. Given that our aim in this paper is di¤erent we shall consider the
reduced game when we refer to the game played in the rst three calls of the
Program.
3.1.2 The new mechanism
Since the fourth Program call, the assignment procedure was completely
reshaped. The main innovation was the elimination of preacceptances. Under
the new mechanism, any researcher willing to participate is eligible. Only
one research proposal is necessary to enter the selection. This mechanism
just imposes the application cost to the participants. On the other hand,
the matching stage is completely decentralized. In this way the universities
preserved their independence in hiring new personnel.
1. Candidatesapplication. Applicants simultaneously send their sci-
entic curriculum vitae and a research proposal to the evaluation agency.
Let R1 be the set of agents who apply for a Ramón y Cajal contract.
The Evaluation Agency ranks all applicants. The best Q0 =
min f]R1; Qg ranked researchers r1; :::; rQ0, are entitled to get a con-
tract nanced through the Program. We call them idoneous. The
remaining applications are denitely disregarded.
2. Assignment. In a decentralized way, the departments and the ido-
neous applicants sign contracts. Each department di cannot sign more
than qi contracts with idoneous researchers. A matching  is agreed.
We assume the decentralized matching, which is an extension of So-
tomayor (2003) to the many to one case, takes place as follows.
2.1 Each department d proposes a subset of selected researchersR(d) among
the set of idoneous researchers.
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2.1.1 r1 joins a department d among the ones that have selected her, if any.
2.1.t (2  t  Q0) rt chooses a department among the ones that have selected
her and have unlled positions.
3.1.3 The dynamic game
Along the process of the dynamic game the set of departments is xed along
the process D
The old and new mechanisms are the two alternatives o¤ered to the re-
search centers. We introduce a previous state in which research centers de-
cided which mechanism to play an then the chosen mechanism is played.
1. Step 1: Departments majority (and sincerely) vote for choosing between
the old and the new mechanism.
2. Step 2: The mechanism chosen is played.
t Step t: Departments vote by majority (and sincerely) to choose between
the old and the new mechanism.
t+1 Step t+ 1: The chosen mechanism is played.
3.1.4 Additional assumptions
We shall assume a behavior of the research centers that is both commonly
accepted and against the results we want to obtain. We shall assume that
research centers are either endogamic or strongly endogamic.The less en-
dogamic theywere, the better for our results, so that any relaxation of this
conditions shall work in favor of our results.
Denition 9 A department is "endogamic" if 8d; d0 2 D, 8i; i0 2 I td; i00 2
I td00, 8o; o0 2 OtnI td; 8t  1
1. iP tdo
2. iP tdi
0 () iT ti0
3. oP tdo
0 () oT to0
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Denition 10 A department is "collusively endogamic" if 8d; d0 2 D, 8i; i0 2
I td; i
00 2 I td00, 8o; o0 2 OtnI td; 8t  1
1. ?P tdi00
2. iP tdo
3. iP tdi
0 () iT ti0
4. oP tdo
0 () oT to0
Notice that endogamy is a two-side phenomenon. It is true that research
departments prefer their insiders but it is also true that insider researchers
prefer to stay in their own department than to move to another one. To
strengthen our results, we shall assume that insiders are faithful to their
research centers.
This behavior can be seen looking at data on the rst call (the one with
the largest stock of insiders). Table 2 shows that most of the applicants seek
and receive preaceptances from only one research center. This can be either
because centers are collusively endogamic or because researchers only con-
sider acceptable the center where they are incumbent. Note that "collusively
endogamic" centers can impose faithfulness on their candidates.
Denition 11 A researcher is faithful if i 2 I td then d is is favorite depart-
ment.
Finally, we shall need a technical property to avoid the inuence of strong
tastes or preferences.
Denition 12 Property 1: If i 2 I td, o 2 OnI td and oT ti then o is acceptable
to d.
Although Property 1 is an additional restriction on department prefer-
ences that could be included in the earlier endogamic denitions, it has been
presented separately because it is only needed in the new mechanism.
We shall assume that, under the old mechanism, it is more costly to hire
an outsider than an insider. This is due to the fact that the preacceptance
requirement makes the departments to undertake the screening process of
candidates. Such process requires studying each applicant curriculum before
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deciding whether to endorse her or not. Under the new mechanism, though,
screening of candidates is centralized in the evaluation agency, so that all
the involved departments receive the same objective information about the
selected applicants. Therefore, selection costs are much smaller for the de-
partments. Let cO and cN be the cost for a department of hiring an outsider
under the new and the old mechanism, respectively, where cN < cO. Besides,
the cost of hiring an insider is zero (or it is simply much lower than the one
for an outsider and it is thus normalized to zero).
Even if we do not model explicitly how insiders form their success prob-
abilities, it is natural to assume that after a nite number of periods being
rejected, a researcher will stop applying because it will become discouraged.
Let d 2 [0; 1) be the discouragement ratio of insiders in the research center d
who wer not granted in the previous call, which it is assumed to be constant
over time for simplicity. Let also d be the capacity to generate new insiders
in research center d. Therefore, the set of insiders in period t + 1 assuming
that no insider in d was granted in period t isI td+ d I td  d I td = I t+1d  ,
so that the number of insiders that will apply on the next period isI t+1d  = I td (1 + d   d),
and if d > d, then I td > I t+1d  8d 2 D;8t  1.
Eventually, for some t, jI tdj < qtd, so at some point departments will have
to consider outsider candidates. In fact, the change in the application and
elegibility rules along the succesive calls of the program made harder to have
insider candidates.
The total number of applications, shown in Table 3, experienced a sharp
drop in 2004, precisely when the mechanism (which a¤ected, among other
things, to the elegibility rule) was reformed. It is interesting to remark that
since 2002 a signicant proportion of earlier unsuccessful candidates applied
in latter calls, as it is shown in the upper panel of Table 4. Since 2002,
at least 41 percent of the applicants had applied in a previous call. In the
middle panel, we report the number of granted applications by call and by
number of previous applications, and the corresponding relative frequencies
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of succesful applications (as an estimate of the unconditional probability of
being awarded with a grant) in the lower panel. From this latter information,
we see that the probabilities of receiving a grant are kept at moderately high
values even for those with two or more previous applications. This evidence
suggests that, among those candidates which are not awarded in a particular
call, discouraged individuals (those not applying in the next call) have lower
average quality than those who apply again.
3.2 Additional evidence
It appears that the average scores of the candidates in any year di¤er very
much by area, which reects heterogeneity both in the quality of candidates
by area and in the evaluation criteria of each areas committee. In Table
5, we report the average scores, broken down by call and by each of the 24
research areas. In general, the average score appears to be larger in 2004 than
in 2001 for most areas, yet given the standard errors (not reported here) the
di¤erences over time are not statistically signicant in most areas. However,
in no case we can attribute such di¤erences to variation in the overall quality
of the applicants.
An interesting change in the application requirements took place in the
third call, in 2003. With the acquiescence of research centers, applications
without preacceptance were allowed, leaving preacceptance as optional. As
a consequence, as it is shown in Table 6, about 11 percent of the researchers
in 2003 applied without any preacceptance. Looking at the marginal distri-
butions of applicants with and without preacceptance, we can see a larger
average score for the rst ones, though the di¤erence is not statistically sig-
nicant. Also, the percentage of granted applications is much larger for those
applicants with preacceptance.
A deepest change took place in 2004, by which the preacceptance was
completely removed from the application procedure. If we concentrate on
those researchers who applied in 2003, we have two di¤erent groups, those
with preacceptance and those without preacceptance in 2003. Their (uncon-
ditional) estimated success probabilities in 2003 (27.5 vs. 16.9 percent) are
remarkably di¤erent. Among the applicants in 2003 who were rejected, 614
applicants with preacceptance and 64 without preacceptance applied again
in 2004. The marginal analysis that provides Table 6 (in which there is no
control for the characteristics of the candidates) indicates that the average
scores and the success frequencies in 2004 of the candidates who had also
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applied in 2003 look alike (if anything, they are slightlly larger for those
without preacceptance in 2003).
We can take advantage of the past information about this fraction of
applicants in 2004 who also have applied in 2003. The change in the applica-
tion requirements, by which preacceptance was completely removed in 2004,
provides a natural experiment.
4 Theoretical implications
Proposition 1 Assume that departments are endogamic (collusively endogamic).
Then, there exists a unique stable matching.
Proof. By contradiction: Assume it is not the case. Then, there exists a
research department d and a researcher r such d = R(r) and R(r)PrD(r)
where R(r) and D(r) denote the optimal stable matching for researchers
and departments, respectively.
Let r be the best ranked of such researchers according to T such that
R(r) 6= D(r): Consider the following order of execution of the Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm. First, all insiders apply, according to their ranking
in T . Then, all researchers in OnI according to their ranking in T . By
the time r makes her proposal, the department d = R(r) is rs favorite
department among the ones who have empty positions at this point. Let
Rd be the set of researchers who are better ranked than r according to T
and belong to the same group as r. In this case, they all are outsiders. It
is the case that none of them has already requested d as her best option or
has taken the last position d o¤ers. This is because if this where the case,
d 6= R(r):
Now consider the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm where copies of the
departments make proposals. Since d = R(r)PrD(r), it must happen that
r never receives a proposal from d. If r is not an insider for d, then d lls
all her positions with better insiders and/or better ranked outsiders (in the
case of collusively endogamic preferences, they cannot be only insiders). But
then, these researchers strictly prefer R to D and are better ranked than
r, a contradiction with the previous statement.
The same argument applies when r is an insider for d, but now, before
proposing to r, d has already lled all its positions with better ranked re-
searchers.
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Notice that the case of collusively endogamic preferences is stronger than
the case of endogamic preferences. Therefore, collusion among research cen-
ters in the form of rejecting any insider from other research center will
strengthen the uniqueness result.
Corollary 1 The old mechanism under collusion has a unique SPE outcome
which is generally not responsive to T .
Proof. Let us consider the situation where each research center has
an insider and the insider has enough quality to pass the screening process
undetaken by the evaluation agency. In such a case, the only stable matching
is the mutual agreement match. This match is not responsive to T .
Good researchers prefer the new mechanism to the old one so they would
always push in favor of the new mechanism. With the new mechanism, the
rst Q ranked researchers have the chance of obtaining a position.
Corollary 2 The new mechanism under collusion has a unique SPE out-
come. If additionally Property 1 holds and all research centers are acceptable
to any researcher, then all the best Q researchers are hired.
Proof. The uniqueness follows from the main result on the new mecha-
nism and holds also under the more general conditions. The second part of
this Corollary holds because all good researchers become acceptable to the
research centers and viceversa. Therefore, no preselected researcher will be
prevented to sign a contract because of the agents preferences.
Lemma 1 Let rTr0 and assume N(r0) 2 D. Then, N(r)RrO(r). If Prop-
erty 1 holds and all research centers are acceptable to any researcher, all the
best Q researchers are hired. Then N(r) 2 D.
Proof. Let r be the best of such researchers. The rst claim is obvious
when O(r) = r or if O(r) = d 2 D and r 2 Id. The second claim follows
from Property 1 and the fact that all research centers are acceptable to any
researcher.
If departments have enough insider candidates to ll their positions, they
prefer the old mechanism to the new one.
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Proposition 2 If the number of insiders is big enough jI tdj  qtd, the depart-
ments prefer the old mechanism to the new one. Some departments prefer it
strictly.
Recall that hiring costs are higher for outsider than for insiders. This
means that departments without insiders always strictly prefer the new mech-
anism over the old one.
Proposition 3 If jI tdj = 0, then department d strictly prefers the new mech-
anism. If hiring costs were equal for insiders and outsiders, then d would be
indi¤erent.
Lemma 2 If d > d; 8d 2 D once the new mechanism is chosen, the new
mechanism will be played forever afterwards.
Proof. This follows from Propositions 2 and 3 and the dynamics that
we have assumed for insiders because if d > d then jI tdj >
I t+1d  8d 2 D,
8t  1. If it is convenient to play the new mechanism for a majority of
departments at time t. then the number of departments willing to play the
new mechanism will not decrease along time t:
As the stock of insiders decreases, the departments are more prompted
to switch to the new mechanism in order to minimize the search cost.
Proposition 4 Assume cN < cO and d > d. Then, the departments will
eventually switch from the old game to the new one, and the new one will be
played forever afterwards.
Proof. Since d > d ! jI tdj >
I t+1d  8d 2 D, 8t  1, whenever this
makes convenient to play the new mechanism for a majority of departments
at time t, the number of departments willing to play the new mechanism will
not decrease along time t: In fact, the number of insiders, given that d > d,
will decrease until jI tdj = 0 at some t: Then, by Proposition 3 the new game
is always chosen thereafter.
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5 Policy analysis
The change in the application requirements, by which preacceptance is com-
pletely removed in 2004, provides a natural experiment by which certain
individuals are a¤ected by the policy change. In particular, we can compare
the outcomes in 2004 and 2003 for those applicants without preacceptance
in 2003. Our approach simply consists on a di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DID)
estimator. Formally, let NoPrei be a binary variable which equals one if indi-
vidual i had not a preacceptance in 2003 and zero otherwise, and let Y 2004i
a binary variable for the period after the policy change (i.e., it equals one for
those observations in 2004 and zero for those observations in 2003). Let Yi be
the outcome that we are interested in (e.g., individual score), and ui an un-
observed random error which includes individual characteristics not included
in the specication. To analyze the e¤ect of the change in the elegibility
rules, we consider
Yi = 0 + 0Y 2004i + 1NoPrei + 1Y 2004i NoPrei + ui
The critical coe¢ cient is 1, which measures the di¤erential e¤ect on the
mean outcome of the policy change for those individuals without preaccep-
tance in 2004. It can be easily seen (see Wooldridge, 2002) that 1 captures
the di¤erence between the time change in the average outcome between 2003
and 2004 for the individuals a¤ected by the policy rule and the corresponding
change for the remaining individuals.
The validity of this simple specication requires that the only source of
mean variation being the policy change. In order to control for unmeasured
di¤erences in individuals that are not attributable to the policy change, we
add di¤erent controls for the 24 application areas (we include a set of bi-
nary variables corresponding to each di¤erent area), as well as individual
characteristics. The individual characteristics that we have available are the
country zone in which the individual earned her PhD, the years passed since
she earned the PhD, the country zone of residence at the time of application,
a binary variable about whether the individual has delivered more than one
application in that call. As country zones, we take Spain as the reference
country, and dene binary variables for UE-15 countries (excluding spain),
Other European countries, Latin American countries, North American coun-
tries (US and Canada), Other OECD countries, and Other countries (what
basically includes non-OECD Asian and African countries). These two sets
of binary variables are interacted with Y 2004i in one of the specications in
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order to allow their e¤ects to vary between 2003 and 2004. In addition, we
include the variable endogamy i, which equals one for those candidates with
a preaceptance in 2003 in the same centre in which they earned the PhD and
zero otherwise (those that either belong to collusively endogamic depart-
ments or are faithful); a second order polynomial in years i, which measures
the time passed (in years) since the candidate earned her PhD; and Several
projects, a binary variable which indicates if the candidate has proposed more
than one project.
We consider two alternative outcome variables for each individual: the
score given to the candidate and whether the candidate is awarded with the
grant or not. In the case of the empirical model for scores, we regress by
OLS the score achieved by each individual on the covariates that we have
presented. The results are shown in Table 7. Column (i) and (ii) include
the simplest specications, with and without the set of binary variables for
research areas. The set of area dummies are found to be strongly signicant,
yet in any case the major result, which concerns the estimate of 1, is very
similar in both columns. From such estimate, we can assert after the change
in the application requirements in 2004, the score for applicants without
preacceptance in 2003 who applied again in 2004 have, on average, a higher
score by about 9 points. The three last columns provide include, in addition
to area dummies, the further covariates discussed earlier. In column (iii),
the endogamy variable, the second-order polynomial in the time passed after
nishing the PhD, and the indicator for several projects were added. All
these variables appear as signicant, and the e¤ect of the policy change is
also positive and signicant, yet the estimated e¤ect becomes smaller than
in the earlier columns. The time passed since the PhD was nished has a
quadratic e¤ect, which is positive but marginally decreasing for those with a
relatively recent PhD. In the absence of other covariates capturing candidate
quality, this variable captures the fact that, ceteris paribus, the longer the
time since the PhD was nished, the larger the scientic production of the
candidate. In this same line of reasoning, proposing several projects has a
positive e¤ect on the score. Last, the e¤ect of our indicator for endogamic
behaviour is positive.
In column (iv), the sets of binary variables for PhD zone and residence
zone were added, taking Spain as the reference group, whose dummy variable
is omitted. We believe that this information can help to capture candidate
quality better. First, the variables for PhD zones capture the average quality
of the academic centres within. Second, the variables for residence may
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capture the specic quality of the candidate, because in most cases they
proxy the place were the candidate is working at the time of application (so
the larger the quality of the candidate, the larger the quality of the centre
that is willing to hire her). We have also provided tests for joint signicance
of the set of PhD and residence variables, respetively. Regarding the PhD
variables, we nd plausible positive e¤ects for EU-15, North America and
other OECD countries, though they turn to be individually and jointly non
signicant. More interestingly, the Residence variables show to be strongly
signicant both individually and jointly. Applicants with residence in North
America,other OECD countries, and EU-15 countries achieve higher average
scores, whereas residents in Latin America, non-OECD Asian and African
countries achieve signicantly lower average scores. Concerning the main
aspect of interest, the policy change e¤ect is positive and signicant, its
magnitude being very similar to that in column (iii), so that those without
preacceptance in 2003 who applied again in 2004 have on average a positive
di¤erential score about 7.8 points.
In the last column, we interact the covariates used in column (iv) with
Y 2004i in order to allow di¤erential e¤ects of such variables between 2003
and 2004. The sets of PhD dummies and Residence dummies are signicant
at levels below ten percent. The same happens with the sets of these vari-
ables interacted with Y 2004i, reecting di¤erential e¤ect of these candidate
characteristics in the two di¤erent calls. We also nd a slight di¤erential ef-
fect of the polynomial in time passed since the candidate earn the PhD. Also,
the e¤ect of the endogamy variable appears much stronger for the 2004 call.
The qualitative result about our major feature of interest, the average dif-
ferential score in 2004 for those without preacceptance in 2003, is signicant
and positive, about 9 points.
In addition to the e¤ect of the change in application procedure on the
score, it is worth to evaluate whether such change actually a¤ects the grants
awarded. However, given that now our dependent variable is dychotomic,
reecting concession or rejection of the grant, we will use a probit model in
order to estimate the e¤ects of the earlier covariates on the probability of
obtaining the grant. Given that the percentage of grants per research area
lie about 24%, out interest for the e¤ect on the average score is limited,
since granted applications are mostly quite above the average score of the
corresponding area. Therefore, we have also analyzed whether the policy
change has a¤ected the concession of grants. We follow the same empirical
strategy as with the model for scores. In this case, since all candidates with
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PhD or residence in non-OECD Asia or Africa did not receive the grant,
they were excluded from the sample. The estimation results are shown in
Table 8. Regarding our main feature of interest, we nd a positive e¤ect for
those without preacceptance in 2003 who applied again in 2004. In all the
specications, the estimate of this e¤ect is signicant at the 1 percent level.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the e¤ect is not sensitive to the addition of
further control variables, as PhD and residence dummies and interactions of
variables with the year of application. Evaluating at the average values of the
variables, for a candidate without preacceptance in 2003 who applied again
in the next call, the increase in her probability of being granted in 2004 with
respect to 2003 is about ten percentage points. The results provide evidence
that the prospects of outsiders are signicantly improved when the elegibility
requirement of preacceptance is fully removed.
6 Conclusions
The Ramón y Cajal Program was created to improve Spanish scientic re-
searchersbase by promoting the recruitment of top-quality researchers. We
analyze the role of the research centers in the redesign of the original ver-
sion of the mechanism and study the reasons they have to impose it in the
rst place. An appropriate design should consider agents motivations so as
to provide them with the right incentives to perform their goals. We setup
a theoretical framework which describes the agent behavior as well as the
Program procedures both under the old and the new mechanism. The theo-
retical assumptions are justied by means of the descriptive evidence based
on data about applications to the Program in the rst ve calls. The re-
moval of the preliminary acceptance requirement made that all applicants
were considered by the evaluation committees. The new design means an
improvement over the original one. While it is not fully guaranteed that
departments are competing for the best researchers (although it is under our
theoretical assumptions), it ensures that the overall quality of the selected
applicants is improved, and the impossibility to exclude any candidate. Be-
sides, under the new mechanism, research centers do not bear the costs of
screening candidates.
The new mechanism is thus more e¢ cient because no qualied researcher
can be excluded, and screening costs are endogenized by the system. The
benets of the new design put under question the rationale for the preac-
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ceptance requirement in the old mechanism, as well as the motivation of its
removal. The answer to this is clear-cut. The original mechanism was partly
aimed at favoring the large stock of insiders in the research centers, and it
was reformed as soon as the preacceptance was not useful anymore for the
majority of research centers.
Among the predictions of the theoretical model, the most relevant is that
the new mechanism favors that the best researchers are granted, irrespective
on whether they are insiders or otusiders with regard to the research centers
involved. We test the validity of this prediction taking advantage of the fact
that the succesive changes in 2003 and 2004 in the elegibility rules a¤ect dif-
ferently insider and outsider candidates. Our empirical results point out that
the full removal of the preacceptance requirement favors the opportunities of
outsiders, keeping consistency with our theoretical results.
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Table 1
Final Distribution of Ramón y Cajal Contracts in the rst call
Insiders
All 60%
Outsiders
Non-resident 14%
Resident 26%
All 40%
(Source: DGI, MCYT from Sanz Menéndez et al., 2002)
Table 2
Preacceptances by candidate in the rst call
Number of preacceptances 1 2 3 4 5 > 5
Applicants 2229 486 124 45 24 14
(percentage) 76.3% 16.6% 4.2% 1.5% 0.8% 0.4%
Granted 562 150 31 11 12 8
(percentage) 72.6% 19.4% 4.0% 1.4% 1.6% 1.0%
(source: DGI, MCYT from Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2006)
Table 3
Applications by call
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total 2793 2557 2603 1357 1318
Granted 772 476 685 291 241
% 27.6 18.6 26.3 21.4 18.3
Drop out 360 111 95 15 1
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Table 4
Applications by call and by number of previous applications
Total
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0 2793 1497 1447 561 696
1 1060 615 404 269
2 541 228 167
3 164 111
4 75
Granted
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0 772 289 365 117 140
1 187 156 90 55
2 164 57 19
3 27 14
4 13
% of granted applications
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0 27.6 19.3 25.2 20.9 20.1
1 17.6 25.4 22.3 20.5
2 30.3 25.0 11.4
3 16.5 12.6
4 17.3
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Table 5
Average scores by call and by research area
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Physic and Space Sciences 73.0 77.8 76.8 81.6 79.9
Earth Sciences 60.9 74.7 72.5 68.3 72.8
Materials Science and Technology 63.2 70.6 71.2 77.3 71.3
Chemistry 64.1 65.5 75.5 82.0 65.4
Chemical Technology 63.0 73.7 75.8 87.1 87.0
Plant and Animal Biology. Ecology 64.6 69.5 74.0 75.0 78.6
Agriculture 63.7 69.4 68.4 73.5 74.2
Livestock and Fishery 61.1 65.1 73.4 64.3 68.6
Food Science and Technology 59.1 64.6 65.9 74.7 82.5
Molecular and Cell Biology and Genetics 62.2 67.8 69.6 69.3 70.6
Physiology and Pharmacology 63.8 73.3 71.6 72.2 72.1
Medicine 59.9 66.2 68.7 71.6 70.2
Mechanical, Ship and Aeronautical Engineering 59.6 65.0 59.6 81.4 69.1
Electrical and Electronic Eng. and Robotics 65.8 65.1 61.4 63.2 73.0
Civil Engineering And architecture 50.6 64.6 48.2 77.5 72.0
Mathematics 68.4 78.6 56.2 77.3 83.1
Computer Sciences 51.9 59.7 61.5 59.9 60.2
Information and Communication Technologies 60.8 74.4 69.4 67.0 69.3
Economics 69.8 65.3 60.7 80.8 74.3
Law 54.8 66.6 59.5 68.7 74.5
Social Sciences 27.6 56.5 60.1 61.6 65.5
Psychology and Education Sciences 52.9 59.4 45.7 57.5 66.7
Philology and Philosophy 59.4 64.2 75.0 81.4 79.6
History and Art 60.3 79.7 79.6 85.5 87.8
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Table 6
Characteristics of applications in 2003 and 2004
Applications in 2003
Number Avg. score Std. dev. Granted % Granted
All 2603 70.9 18.9 685 26.3
With preacceptance 2307 71.5 18.7 635 27.5
w/o preacceptance 296 66.3 19.5 50 16.9
Applications in 2004
Number Avg. score Std. dev. Granted % Granted
All 1357 75.0 17.4 291 21.4
Did not apply in 2003 679 72.3 18.8 139 20.5
Also applied in 2003 678 77.7 15.3 152 22.4
With preacceptance 614 77.5 15.4 135 22.0
w/o preacceptance 64 79.8 14.0 17 26.6
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Table 7
Model of scores
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Research area dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PhD and Residence zone dummies No No No Yes Yes
Constant 71.46 68.17 61.95 59.82 59.33
(0.39) (1.74) (1.83) (1.93) (1.98)
Y2004 3.33 3.57 3.18 3.05 5.54
(0.58) (0.57) (0.56) (0.55) (3.13)
NoPre -5.20 -5.23 -4.83 -5.22 -5.58
(1.19) (1.18) (1.19) (1.18) (1.19)
NoPre  Y2004 10.24 9.26 7.68 7.76 8.98
(2.00) (2.02) (2.01) (2.00) (2.05)
endogamy 1.97 2.14 1.33
(0.65) (0.68) (0.79)
years 1.62 1.85 2.02
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
years2 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Several projects 6.73 6.72 6.83
(0.60) (0.59) (0.71)
endogamy  Y2004 2.52
(1.18)
years  Y2004 -0.35
(1.07)
years2  Y2004 -0.02
(0.09)
Several projects  Y2004 -0.36
(1.08)
Wald tests of signicance
All variables 55876 73447 81421 83935 84753
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Area dummies 373.1 386.4 400.9 403.6
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Polynomial in years 103.52 129.32 126.36
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poly. in years  Y2004 7.24
(2.68)
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Table 7 (ctd)
Model of scores. PhD and residence zone.
PhD (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
EU-15 0.38 -0.47
(0.90) (1.12)
Europe other -4.79 -4.88
(2.28) (2.17)
Latin America -2.28 -5.98
(1.72) (2.23)
North America 1.80 1.34
(1.71) (2.02)
OECD other 4.76 4.62
(3.88) (4.71)
Other 3.04 -1.46
(4.99) (5.86)
Residence
EU-15 3.30 4.61
(0.80) (0.94)
Europe other -3.23 -2.09
(4.30) (5.05)
Latin America -4.07 -1.25
(2.29) (2.81)
North America 6.50 7.92
(0.99) (1.21)
OECD other 5.37 6.97
(2.09) (2.56)
Other -15.92 -13.69
(5.67) (6.30)
Wald tests of signicance
PhD dummies 9.84 13.20
(% p-value) (13.15) (4.00)
Residence dummies 73.56 70.86
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 7 (ctd)
Model of scores.
Interactions of PhD and residence zone with Y2004
PhD  Y2004 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
EU-15 2.32
(1.70)
Europe other -1.04
(5.65)
Latin America 9.32
(3.12)
North America 0.53
(3.12)
OECD other 0.10
(8.05)
Other 13.59
(10.30)
Residence  Y2004
EU-15 -4.11
(1.56)
Europe other -3.23
(9.09)
Latin America -7.20
(4.20)
North America -3.71
(1.78)
OECD other -4.92
(3.92)
Other -8.58
(11.85)
Wald tests of signicance
PhD  Y2004 dummies 11.58
(% p-value) (7.20)
Residence  Y2004 dummies 13.14
(% p-value) (4.09)
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Table 8
Probability of obtaining the grant
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Research area dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PhD and Residence zone dummies No No No Yes Yes
Constant -0.60 -0.69 -0.92 -1.02 -1.06
(0.03) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Y2004 -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 -0.23 0.40
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.26)
NoPre -0.36 -0.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.36
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
NoPre  Y2004 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.49 0.54
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
endogamy 0.09 0.08 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
years 0.05 0.07 0.09
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
years2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Several projects 0.38 0.39 0.38
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
endogamy  Y2004 0.18
(0.12)
years  Y2004 -0.20
(0.09)
years2  Y2004 0.012
(0.007)
Several projects  Y2004 0.02
(0.10)
Wald tests of signicance
All variables 1015.4 1104.4 1127.0 1150.3 1165.9
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Area dummies 161.6 173.4 173.3 171.4
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Polynomial in years 22.7 36.2 45.6
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poly. in years  Y2004 10.4
(% p-value) (0.56)
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Table 8 (ctd)
Probability of obtaining the grant. PhD and residence zone.
PhD (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
EU-15 -0.07 -0.07
(0.07) (0.09)
Europe other -0.41 -0.59
(0.16) (0.20)
Latin America -0.17 -0.36
(0.14) (0.18)
North America -0.07 -0.07
(0.13) (0.16)
OECD other 0.41 0.49
(0.29) (0.37)
Residence
EU-15 0.21 0.27
(0.06) (0.07)
Europe other 0.09 0.19
(0.30) (0.333)
Latin America 0.06 0.18
(0.16) (0.19)
North America 0.51 0.55
(0.08) (0.10)
OECD other 0.60 0.58
(0.15) (0.19)
Wald tests of signicance
PhD dummies 9.7 13.8
(% p-value) (8.3) (1.7)
Residence dummies 52.1 41.6
(% p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 8 (ctd)
Probability of obtaining the grant.
Interactions of PhD and residence zone with Y2004
PhD  Y2004 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
EU-15 0.02
(0.15)
Europe other 0.62
(0.42)
Latin America 0.50
(0.28)
North America -0.02
(0.28)
OECD other -0.25
(0.60)
Residence  Y2004
EU-15 0.27
(0.07)
Europe other 0.19
(0.33)
Latin America 0.18
(0.19)
North America 0.55
(0.10)
OECD other 0.58
(0.19)
Wald tests of signicance
PhD  Y2004 dummies 15.0
(% p-value) (13.3)
Residence  Y2004 dummies 55.7
(% p-value) (0.00)
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